and studying under them at their L’Abri fellowship in Switzerland. In many ways, this book is an updated re-articulation and expanded application (geared specifically with early 21st century issues in mind) of Schaeffer’s own approach to apologetics, especially as presented inHow Should We Then Live? In Part One, she focuses on explaining and illustrating the problems inherent in the (false) conception of truth as a compartmentalized (and therefore relativized) construct – a conception to which modern, evangelical Christians have so thoroughly succumbed that they scarcely retain the skills necessary to even identify the problem, much less begin to map a way out. The former task alone requires something like a forced regurgitation and careful consideration of a whole host of unexamined assumptions andreductios which evangelicals have, as a collective group, been swallowing (some of their own devising and others foisted upon them by rationalism, empiricism, naturalism, and other inimical worldviews) in a steady stream for the past several centuries. Other tangental themes include the divorce of faith from reason, logic from emotion, and God and religion from the public square. Part Two deals primarily with naturalistic evolution, wherein Pearcey, on the one hand, exposes the submerged assumptions, leaps of faith, and (in a few cases) outright frauds (e.g. the peppered tree moth study and Heckel’s hypothesis of embryonic recapitulation, both of which have been thoroughly discredited yet continue to show up in evolutionary textbooks and other materials) which have been used to prop up not only the “truth” of natural selection, but also in turn, modern science’s hegemony over every other branch of knowledge. Part Three provides a detailed look at the history of evangelicalism, with a detailed explanation of the movement’s process of going to seed as it was subsumed by some of the flaws inherent within the movement itself (e.g. a tendency toward radical individualism) while capitulating step-by-step to contrary philosophical and “scientific” worldviews, as outlined in Parts One and Two.Part Four attempts to sketch a way forward, emphasizing the need for Christians to engage boldly and confidently with competing worldviews – both through outright refutation, when called for – but more importantly and effectively, through personal interaction with others, and through lives lived and careers spent in devotion to excellence, love, mercy, compassion, and self-sacrifice in Christ’s Name. To return to Part Two, there were a couple of things from these chapters which made a particular impression upon me and which Pearcy articulated exceptionally well. Taken together, I think they constitute an effective one-two punch against the plausibility of naturalistic evolution. In “Chapter 6: The Science of Common Sensce,” she discusses at length several problems which the observable facts of creation pose for the naturalists. One of these is irreducible complexity, which I certainly think presents a significant problem for naturalists, but which I won’t bother to reiterate here. But the problem which information theory poses to naturalistic evolution and its attempts to account for the genetic code I find in particular to be inexorably compelling – even irrefutable, I would venture to say. To summarize as briefly as I can: Even if one were willing to grant that some natural forms might be self-generating and self-replicating, based on the basic mathematical laws of the universe’s construction – think fractal-based forms, such as snowflakes, crystals, and some popular computer screen savers, all of which can be highly complex and which exhibit a basic similarity on the one hand but a virtually limitless variability on the other, or the organized chaos exhibited in the swirling forms of hurricanes and spiral galaxies – the genetic code is not like this at all. Information theory states that information itself is independent from the medium by which it is conveyed. The information contained within DNA constitutes, not a fractal-based system of construction or a complex series of mathematical algorithms, but a series of incredibly intricate messages and instructions – an entire language. The hallmark feature of all languages is that their discrete components are sequentially arranged to convey information which is not “regular, repeatable, and predictable,” as in the complex geometrical forms mentioned above, but which is instead “irregular and nonrepeating.” As Pearcy states, “. . .chance processes do not produce this species of complex information. . . . In fact, instead of creating information, chance events tend to scramble information.” So if the information contained within the genetic code constitutes a language (and it does), then that begs the question, “Who wrote the language?,” because languages do not simply write themselves. In fact, it is these very same criteria for languages and messages — complex, irregular, non-repeating, non-fractal or algorithmically-based, and so on – which groups like SETI scan the skies in search of, confident that the appearance of such would necessarily point to an intelligence somewhere out there as the source. But, for reasons which have nothing whatsoever to do with logic or reason, (most of) these very same people refuse to acknowledge the same evidence for intelligent authorship represented by the genetic code, apparently for none other than the arbitrary reason that it comes to them via a microscope (as it were) rather than through a telescope.Also, to briefly explain my “Even if one were willing to grant” qualification above: I don’t believe that the presence of what we refer to as “natural laws” implies that God is removed from personal interaction with creation and in deistic fashion has ceded direct governance of the cosmos to these “laws.” I rather side with Chesterton (and with Scripture) in holding that God, in eternal child-like and wizened delight, never tires of lovingly crafting individual snowflakes and sprial galaxies (for instance). The various “natural laws” which we have been able to discover are simply His ordinary means of bringing this or that about, traces of His typical way of doing things, secrets which he has deigned to let us in on.In the two following chapters from Part Two, “Chapter 7: Today Biology, Tomorrow the World,” and “Chapter 8: Darwins of the Mind,” Pearcy traces the failure of naturalistic evolution to provide any foundation for those things which we as humans inherently hold most precious (preeminently, at the individual level, love, and a deep-seeded longing for transcendence) as well as for ethics and morality – and by extension any cohesive human society, since such cannot exist apart from a shared system of moral values. In brief, even if naturalistic evolution could account for “is,” it cannot possibly account for (or render) “ought.” This fact presents naturalists with an insurmountable problem of inconsistency owing to a fundamental (and gnawing) disconnect between the implications of what they say they believe regarding our origins and how the vast majority are willing to actually live their lives, as well as a lack of any viable justification for insisting on some broadly-held system of moral valuation (which clearly they still desperately want to retain and even to define) since naturalism can (at very best) yield nothing more than categories of valuation which are arbitrary, subjective, and liable to abrupt alteration. Some have tried stubbornly to lurch toward consistency, with disastrous results (Nietzsche comes to mind), but most have to content themselves with pilfering moral categories from the very faith-based worldviews which they deride (Christianity most prominently) and sneeking them through their own back doors, hoping nobody calls them out on it. Pearcy singles out Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmesand educational “reformer” John Dewey and their deliberate attempts to create a God-less morality through their imposition of evolutionary anti-values upon the American legal and educational systems, respectively, as profoundly devastating examples of attempted consistency on the part of naturalists in positions of influence.